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Preface

THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION was established
under the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991. The law
instructs the Council "to evaluate the unemployment compensation program,
including the purpose, goals, countercyclical effectiveness, coverage, benefit
adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding of State administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and any other aspects of the program and make recommendations for improvement."
The Council completed its work in January 1996, after issuing three annual reports. Findings and recommendations on each of the issues that Congress
asked the Council to consider are contained in one or more of these reports.
In addition, each annual report contains a number of background chapters,
summarizing the research findings that informed the Council's deliberations.
The Council's first annual report, issued in February 1994, focused primarily on methods for improving the operation of the Extended Benefits
Program. In addition, it addressed three issues that Congress specifically
requested that the Council consider: use of substate or regional data in triggering the Extended Benefits program, the work search test under Extended
Benefits, and taxation of the wages of alien agricultural workers under the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act.
The Council's second report, issued in February 1995, focused on the regular Unemployment Insurance program. It begins with a Statement of
Purpose for the UI program and makes recommendations concerning the program's countercyclical effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, and trust
fund solvency.

ix
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The Council's third and final report was issued in January 1996. Focused
primarily on defining federal-state relations in the UI program, that report
begins with a statement that responsibilities and powers should be shared
within the Unemployment Insurance program. The report's recommendations suggest methods that could be used to improve the quality and efficiency of the administration of the Unemployment Insurance program.
This compilation contains the findings and recommendations, in chronological order, from the Council's three reports. For easy reference, a doublenumbering system is used for the recommendations. The first number is the
year of the pUblication of the report in which a recommendation appeared,
and the second number shows the order of that recommendation in the original document. (For example, Recommendation 1994-1 is the first recommendation from the 1994 report.)
For cases in which the Council addressed issues in more than one of its
reports, footnotes with asterisks (*) have been added to the original findings
and recommendations noting the location of the additional reference(s). The
subject index in this volume provides additional assistance in locating recommendations. Ordering information for the Council's three annual reports
appears at the end of this document.

1 / 1994 Findings
and Recommendations:
Extended Benefits

PURPOSE OF THE EXTENDED BENEFITS PROGRAM
The Council finds that the nature of unemployment has changed since the
inception of the Unemployment Insurance system. The length of time that
individuals are unemployed, which increases sharply during recessions, has
also increased slowly but steadily during non-recessionary times. Workers
who have been laid off from their jobs are now less likely to return to their
previous jobs than has historically been the case. This indicates an increase
in the level of long-term unemployment in the economy.
The Unemployment Insurance system was designed primarily as a means
of alleviating the hardship caused by short-term unemployment. The system
was never intended to combat long-term unemployment. The purpose of the
Unemployment Insurance system, and in particular the Extended Benefits
program, must be expanded if the system is to deal effectively with the
changing nature of unemployment. In doing so, however, careful consideration must be given to the funding of the system, in order to ensure that expenditures for combatting long-term unemployment do not drain the Unemployment Insurance trust fund reserves. It must also be recognized that while
Unemployment Insurance reform is a necessary component of developing
effective strategies for dealing with long-term unemployment, other
reforms--especially among programs for dislocated workers-will be needed.

NOTE: These fmdings and recommendations are reprinted from Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation (ACUC), Report and Recommendations (Washington, DC: ACUC, 1994), pp. 7-14.
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1994-1. Recommendation
The scope of the Extended Benefits program should be expanded
to enhance the capacity of the Unemployment Insurance system
to provide assistance for long-term unemployed workers as well
as short-term unemployed workers. Those individuals who are
long-term unemployed should be eligible for extended Unemployment Insurance benefits, provided they are participating in
job search activities or in education and training activities, where
available and suitable, that enhance their re-employment
prospects. To maintain the integrity of the Unemployment
Insurance income support system, a separate funding source
should be used to finance job search and education and training
activities for long-term unemployed workers.l

THE TRIGGER FOR EXTENDED BENEFITS
The Council finds that receipt of Unemployment Insurance benefits by the
unemployed has slowly but steadily declined since at least 1947-the first
year for which data on the system are available. In addition to the long-term
downward trend in receipt of benefits, there was a pronounced decline in the
early 1980s, just as the economy entered a recession.
The reasons behind the decline in the Unemployment Insurance system
are many. The long-term decline appears to have been caused by the changing demographics of the labor force, the changing industrial and geographic
composition of employment, and a decline in the solvency of states'
Unemployment Insurance trust funds. * The sharp decline in receipt of benefits in the early 1980s appears to be attributable primarily to changes in federal policies which encouraged the states to increase the solvency of their
trust funds by restricting eligibility for Unemployment Insurance benefits
and/or increasing employers' tax rates, as well as independent state efforts to
improve their trust fund solvency.
The utilization of the Unemployment Insurance system is measured by
the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR). The IUR is the number of Unemployment Insurance recipients, relative to the number of individuals in
lOne member of the Council emphasizes that an increase in employers' payroll taxes should not
be used as the funding source. Another member emphasizes that such a recommendation must be
considered in the context of reform of dislocated workers programs.
*Additional findings on the long-term decline are included in the 1996 findings (see p. 28).
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UI-covered employment. Since the inception of the Extended Benefits program in 1970, states have been required to use the state IUR as a "trigger"
that determines whether or not individuals who have exhausted their regular
UI benefits are eligible for Extended Benefits.
Research has shown that the decline in the utilization of the Unemployment Insurance system has caused the IUR to become a less reliable
indicator of economic conditions, reducing the likelihood that Extended
Benefits will trigger on in states with high unemployment. In addition, just
as the IUR was experiencing a marked decline during the recession of the
1980s, the "trigger" level required to become eligible for Extended Benefits
was raised.
The combination of the reduction in the IUR and the increase in the trigger level resulted in the failure of the Extended Benefits program to trigger
on as unemployment continued to rise during this most recent recession. As
a result, Congress found it necessary to pass a series of emergency extensions
of Unemployment Insurance benefits. The Council finds that emergency
extensions of Unemployment Insurance benefits are extremely inefficient
since they are neither well-timed nor well-targeted. Therefore, it is necessary
to reform the Extended Benefits program prior to the onset of the next recession, in order to minimize the need for future emergency legislation.
The Council has considered a variety of measures that could be used to
trigger the Extended Benefits program. While no perfect measures exist, the
best available evidence about the condition of the overall labor market within a state is the Total Unemployment Rate (TUR), which indicates the supply
of individuals who are unable to find work. It should be noted, however, that
the TUR rates for January 1994 will be affected by the redesign of the Current
Population Survey. An alternative measure of the labor market conditions
that are faced by Unemployment Insurance recipients is the Adjusted Insured
Unemployment Rate (AIUR), which is the IUR adjusted to include those individuals who have exhausted their regular Unemployment Insurance benefits.
The Council finds that while substate (or regional) data are available on
some measures of local labor market conditions, these data are extremely
unreliable measures of the true conditions that the unemployed face.
Furthermore, there would be substantial administrative difficulties in using
either subs tate or regional data for triggering Extended Benefits.
The Council finds that, in addition to problems with the triggers that have
been used to determine whether or not Extended Benefits are available within a state, the thresholds built into the triggers have been problematic. These
thresholds require that a state's unemployment rate (whether measured by the
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IUR or the TUR) exceed the level that prevailed over the previous two-year
period (by a factor of 120 percent for the IUR or 110 percent for the TUR).
The threshold requirements do not significantly affect the number of
states in which Extended Benefits trigger on during a recession. However,
the thresholds have the effect of delaying the point at which Extended
Benefits trigger on in some states with the highest unemployment, as well as
hastening the point at which such states trigger off the Extended Benefits
program. As a result, the thresholds have caused dissatisfaction among some
with the operation of the program since those states suffering the most economic hardship are triggered on for the shortest period of time. This problem
could be addressed by eliminating the thresholds and setting the triggers at a
slightly higher level.

1994-2. Recommendation
The Council is unanimous in the view that there is a pressing need
to reform the Extended Benefits program.
The majority of the Council recommends that the Extended
Benefits program should trigger on when a state's seasonally adjusted total unemployment rate (SlUR) exceeds 6.5 percent as measured before the Current Population Survey redesign! Two members
of the Council recommend that each state should have the choice
of using either the SlUR trigger of 6.5 percent with a threshold
requirement of 110 percent above either of the two previous years,
or an IUR or AIUR trigger set at 4 percent with a threshold requirement of 120 percent over the previous two year period.
The Council hopes Congress can implement these reforms
promptly. Although the Council has reservations about the inefficient targeting of emergency benefits, Congress should extend the
existing Emergency Unemployment Compensation for a six month
period to provide a bridge program until these Extended Benefits
reforms can be implemented. 3

, Two members of the Council recommend that the trigger should be set at 6.5 percent regardless
of any changes in the measured unemployment rate that result from the redesign of the Current
Population Survey.
'Two members do not agree to the recommendation that Emergency Unemployment
Compensation should be extended.
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1994-3. Recommendation
Neither substate nor regional data should be used for the purpose
of determining whether or not Extended Benefits are available
within a given area.

FINANCING EXTENDED BENEFITS REFORM
The Council finds that the integrity of the Unemployment Insurance system
as well as its capacity to adapt to the changing nature of unemployment are
compromised by incorporating its trust funds into the unified federal budget.
While the flow of funds into the Extended Unemployment Compensation
account may be adequate to finance the recommended Extended Benefits
reform, such reform is complicated by the use of dedicated Unemployment
Insurance trust funds for the purpose of deficit reduction. Several members
of the Council believe that prompt action should be taken to correct this situation. Other members feel that the issue of how trust fund accounts should
be treated in the budget is a very complex one, and requires careful consideration within a broader context. The Council intends to revisit this issue in
its future deliberations. *

1994-4. Recommendation
If additional revenue is required to implement the Council's recommendations, such revenue should be generated by a modest
increase in the FUTA taxable wage base, to $8,500. 4,**

WORK SEARCH TEST UNDER EXTENDED BENEFITS
The Council finds that another problematic aspect of the Extended Benefits
program is the federal requirement that, with some exceptions, those individuals who are receiving Extended Benefits must accept a minimum wage
job if one is offered, or become ineligible for benefits. While the Council
understands that recipients of both regular and extended Unemployment
Insurance benefits have an obligation to search actively for work and accept
appropriate job offers, the Council finds the current federal requirements to
*Recommendation 1995-7 addresses this issue.
Two members object to this recommendation.
**The Council later made an alternative recommendation on this issue (see 1996-20).

4
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be excessively onerous. All states use a "suitability" test to determine the
jobs which claimants are required to accept to remain eligible for benefits.
This test gives states the flexibility to ensure adequate work search by
claimants, while protecting unemployed workers' living standards and job
skills by permitting them to decline substandard jobs. The states are in a better position to determine appropriate mechanisms for enforcing a work
search test, given the particular conditions of their labor markets.

1994-5. Recommendation
The federal requirement that individuals who are recelvmg
Extended Benefits must accept a minimum wage job if one is
offered, or become ineligible for benefits, should be eliminated.
Each state should be allowed to determine an appropriate work
search test, based on the conditions of its labor market.

STATE TRUST FUND SOLVENCY
The Council finds an overall decline in receipt of Unemployment Insurance
benefits among the unemployed. This decline is at least partially caused by
the inadequate reserves of many states' trust funds. During the past decade,
many states with low or negative trust fund reserves have found themselves
in the position of either having to increase taxes on employers in the midst of
an economic downturn, or having to take measures to restrict eligibility and
benefits for the unemployed. Some believe that this reliance on pay-as-yougo funding has worked to the overall detriment of the Unemployment
Insurance system.
The Council believes that it would be in the interest of the nation to begin
to restore the forward-funding nature of the Unemployment Insurance system, resulting in a building up of reserves during good economic times and a
drawing down of reserves during recessions. The Council finds, however,
that any move toward creating federal guidelines for states' Unemployment
Insurance trust fund accounts must be carefully weighed. Otherwise, there
will be a risk of creating undue incentives for the states to restrict the eligibility and level of Unemployment Insurance benefits in order to achieve the
solvency guidelines. The Council intends to make specific recommendations
on this issue in future reports. *
*The Council made recommendations on both solvency and eligibility issues in its 1995 report.
Recommendations 1995-3 to 1995-6 address solvency, and Recommendations 1995-9 and 1995-17
to 1995-20 address eligibility.
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FUTA TAXATION OF ALIEN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

The Council was asked by Congress to consider the treatment of alien agricultural workers within the Unemployment Insurance system. Currently, the
wages paid to alien agricultural workers with H2-A visas are exempt from the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). This exemption is set to expire on
January 1, 1995.
The Council finds that there are arguments both for and against continuing this exemption. Under the current exemption, alien agricultural workers are less costly to hire than domestic workers, on whom FUTA taxes
must be paid. This cost differential may create an incentive for substitution
of foreign workers for U.S. workers, which argues in favor of repeal of the
exemption. Furthermore, the process of certifying workers and issuing H2-A
visas imposes costs on the federal and state governments that have the
responsibility for overseeing this process. The vast majority (97 percent) of
the cost of the certification process is funded through the FUTA tax. Since
FUTA serves as the mechanism for funding the costs of the certification
process, there is an additional rationale for repealing the exemption of H2-A
workers from FUTA taxation.
On the other hand, H2-A workers are ineligible to receive Unemployment
Insurance benefits since their visas require that they return to their country of
origin within ten days after their employment terminates. Consequently,
these individuals cannot meet the "available for work" test of the
Unemployment Insurance system. Thus, FUTA taxes would be imposed upon
the wages of individuals who cannot receive Unemployment Insurance benefits, which argues against imposing the FUTA tax on their wages.
On balance, the Council finds that the arguments in favor of FUTA taxation of alien agricultural workers outweigh the arguments against continuing
that exemption.

1994-6. Recommendation
As of January 1, 1995, the wages of alien agricultural workers
(H2-A workers) should be subject to FUTA taxes.

j
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2 / 1995 Findings
and Recommendations:
Benefits, Financing,
and Coverage

THE PURPOSE OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation finds that, although
an increasing percentage of the unemployed experience long spells of unemployment, the majority of the unemployed experience relatively short unemployment spells. Similarly, while a growing minority of individuals who
receive Unemployment Insurance exhaust their benefits without having
found new employment, the majority of individuals receive Unemployment
Insurance benefits for a relatively short period of time before returning to
employment. This reality dictates that the Unemployment Insurance system
must be designed to deal effectively with a variety of needs. In particular, the
system must both provide temporary wage replacement to individuals and
facilitate the productive reemployment of those individuals who experience
longer spells of unemployment.
The Unemployment Insurance system also serves an important macroeconomic stabilization role by injecting additional money into the economy
during periods of downturn. This objective, however, can only be achieved
effectively if the system is forward-funded, thereby accumulating funds during periods of economic health.
These findings lead the Council to a formulation of the following statement of purpose for the Unemployment Insurance system.

NOTE: These findings and recommendations are reprinted from Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation (ACUC), Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Benefits, Financing, Coverage (Washington. DC: ACUC. 1995). pp. 7-23.
9
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1995-1. Statement of Purpose
The most important objective of the u.s. system of Unemployment Insurance is the provision of temporary, partial wage
replacement as a matter of right to involuntarily unemployed individuals who have demonstrated a prior attachment to the labor
force. This support should help to meet the necessary expenses of
these workers as they search for employment that takes advantage
of their skills and experience. Their search for productive reemployment should be facilitated by close cooperation among the
Unemployment Insurance system and employment, training, and
education services. In addition, the system should accumulate
adequate funds during periods of economic health in order to promote economic stability by maintaining consumer purchasing
power during economic downturns.

FUNDING OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM
The Unemployment Insurance system's capacity to promote economic stability rests on two key aspects of its funding mechanism. First, the funding
of the system is "experience rated"-that is, employers who have been
responsible for greater demands on the system pay higher taxes and consequently bear a greater share of the system's costs. Second, during periods of
prosperity, the system accumulates reserves that are then spent during periods of economic decline.
Some members of the Council believe that experience rating is a crucial
component of the program, providing effective incentives for employers to
avoid laying off workers. Other members believe that experience rating causes employers to make excessive use of the system's appeal mechanism in an
attempt to keep their experience-rated taxes as low as possible. Although the
Council was unable to resolve this difference of opinion, it intends to address
the issue of experience rating in its next annual report. *
The Council unanimously concludes, however, that promoting economic
stability is an objective that transcends the interests of the states and cannot
be achieved by states working in isolation. While some states have attempted to maintain an adequate degree of forward funding, others have not. The
*The Council returned to this issue in its 1996 report, but was unable to come to a resolution (see
pages 39-40).
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low reserves in some states' trust funds weaken the Unemployment Insurance
system's capacity to achieve its economic stabilization function.
Effectively promoting the forward funding of the Unemployment
Insurance system requires a coherent federal strategy that includes congressionally stated goals. *

1995-2. Recommendation
Congress should establish an explicit goal to promote the forward
funding of the Unemployment Insurance system. In particular,
during periods of economic health, each state should be encouraged to accumulate reserves sufficient to pay at least one year of
Unemployment Insurance benefits at levels comparable to its previous "high cost." For purposes of establishing this forward-funding goal, previous "high cost" should be defined as the average of
the three highest annual levels of Unemployment Insurance benefits that a state has paid in any of the previous 20 calendar years.
To complement these forward-funding goals, financial incentives to
encourage forward funding should be created. This can be done by changing
the structure of the interest rates that the federal government pays to the
states on their Unemployment Insurance trust fund balances. A slight reduction in the interest rate paid on low levels of states' trust funds could be used
to finance a fairly substantial interest rate premium paid on high levels of
reserves. While it is difficult to predict with accuracy how many states would
respond to such incentives, careful management of the interest rate structure
could ensure that these incentives could be financed without additional cost
to the federal government.

1995-3. Recommendation
To encourage further forward funding, an interest premium
should be paid on that portion of a state's Unemployment
Insurance trust fund that is in excess of one "high cost" year of
reserves. The cost of this interest rate premium should be financed
by a reduction in the interest rate paid on that portion of each
state's trust fund that is less than one "high cost" year of reserves.
*The Council issued a comprehensive statement of federal-state responsibilities in its 1996 report
(see Recommendation 1996-1).
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The u.s. Department of Labor should be given authority to adjust
periodically the interest rate structure to ensure that these incentives create no additional cost to the federal government.
The Council finds that the current federal policy of providing short-term,
interest-free loans to state trust funds creates a disincentive for states to forward fund their systems. Preferential loan treatment should be available only
to states that have met, or made satisfactory progress toward, the forwardfunding goal. An example of how satisfactory progress might be defined is
presented in Chapter 5 of this report.

1995-4. Recommendation
Preferential interest rates on federal loans to the states should be
restricted to those states that have achieved (or made satisfactory
progress toward) the forward-funding goal. In particular, the current system of making interest-free, cash-flow federal loans generally available to all states should be ended~ Rather, these interest-free loans should be made available only to those states that
have achieved (or made satisfactory progress toward) the forwardfunding goal prior to the onset of an economic downturn. In other
states, these loans should be subject to the same interest charges
that are incurred on long-term loans to state Unemployment
Insurance trust funds.

1995-5. Recommendation
A method is needed for determining whether a state that has not
yet met the forward-funding goal has made "satisfactory progress"
toward the goal. This method should be based on an empirical
analysis of the rate at which state trust funds must be restored
during periods of economic health in order to achieve the forward-funding goal prior to a recession.

1995-6. Recommendation
When states have achieved (or made satisfactory progress toward)
the forward-funding goal, yet find it necessary to borrow from the
federal government, the interest rate charged on long-term loans
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should be a preferential rate that is 1 percentage point lower than
would otherwise be charged.

The Council has discussed the level at which the taxable wage base and
tax rate established by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) should be
set. This is a complex issue. FUTA revenues are earmarked for financing the
administration of the nation's Unemployment Insurance system, as well as
that of the U.S. Employment Service. However, because the trust funds are
currently held within the unified federal budget, it is not possible for these
programs to achieve direct access to the funds that are earmarked for them.
In addition, a two-tenths surcharge that was imposed in 1977 to payoff trust
fund debts has been extended well beyond the time when the debt was repaid.
Quite apart from these issues, the Council has not yet made a determination
of whether or not additional revenues from FUTA would contribute to more
efficient and effective operation of the Unemployment Insurance system and
the Employment Service.
Another element of complexity results from the fact that the minimum
taxable wage base that the states use for financing their Unemployment
Insurance benefits is tied to the FUTA taxable wage base. On average, those
states with higher taxable wage bases have a higher level of reserves than do
states that have set their taxable wage base at the minimum level of $7,000.
Consequently, raising the FUTA taxable wage base might contribute to the
overall forward funding of the system.
Furthermore, a low taxable wage base within a state tends to impose the
burden of Unemployment Insurance payroll taxes disproportionately on
employers of low-wage workers. To the extent that employers pass on a portion of the tax to their workers in the form of lower wages, therefore, a disproportionate share of the burden of the tax is ultimately borne by low-wage
workers. Those low-wage workers who work part-time or part-year, however, are often ineligible for Unemployment Insurance. As a result, the low
taxable wage base within the Unemployment Insurance system is both
regressive and unfair.
The Council has not yet reached a consensus on how to address these interrelated issues most effectively. As it considers the issues of administrative
funding and efficiency over the course of the next year, however, the issue of
the FUTA taxable wage base and tax rate will once again be addressed. *

*Relevant recommendations are 1994-4 and 1996-20.
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The Council does note, however, that the Unemployment Insurance system
was intended as a self-contained system of social insurance. Inherent in this
design is the principle that funds are accumulated and held in trust solely for
their intended purpose: namely, the payment of benefits to eligible unemployed
workers, economic stimulus, and the costs of administering the system.
Inclusion of FUTA accounts and state Unemployment Insurance trust fund
accounts within the unified federal budget undermines the integrity of the
Unemployment Insurance system. Since federal budget offsets must be identified before additional FUTA funds (which are earmarked for program administration) can be appropriated, some states have found it necessary to divert their
trust funds to pay for administrative expenses--expenses that should be paid
out of the FUTA trust fund. This diversion, while perhaps necessary, tends to
erode the integrity of the system's financing. Employer willingness to contribute to the system, state capacity to develop and maintain adequate trust
funds, and worker confidence in the system are all undermined.
Furthermore, when Unemployment Insurance trust fund balances that have
been explicitly accumulated for countercyclical purposes are used to balance
the annual federal budget, the system loses its capacity to increase spending
automatically during recessions. Consequently, unlike other trust funds held by
the federal government, the Unemployment Insurance trust funds are rendered
fundamentally incapable of achieving one of their major objectives--economic stabilization-through their inclusion in the unified federal budget.

1995-7. Recommendation
All Unemployment Insurance trust funds should be removed from
the unified federal budget.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COVERAGE AND TAXATION
Virtually all wage and salaried workers are covered by Unemployment
Insurance, and their employers pay taxes into the system accordingly. There
are, however, two important exceptions. The first exception is that nonprofit
employers do not pay FUTA taxes, despite the fact that their employees are
eligible for Unemployment Insurance, use the system, and generate administrative costs for the system. In calendar year 1992, this exemption cost the
federal trust funds approximately $300 million. The second exception is that
agricultural workers on small farms are not covered by Unemployment
Insurance. The Council finds no justification for either of these exceptions.
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1995-8. Recommendation
The FUTA exemption for nonprofit employers should be eliminated.

1995-9. Recommendation
The exemption of agricultural workers on small farms from
Unemployment Insurance coverage should be eliminated.'

The Council also finds that Unemployment Insurance taxes owed by farm
labor contractors ("crew leaders") often are not paid. Federal law specifies
that, under most circumstances, these farm labor contractors are the designated employers of their workers and that they are responsible for the payment of Unemployment Insurance taxes. It is difficult, however, to enforce
this provision because of the many obstacles that prevent locating crew leaders who have outstanding tax obligations.
1995-10. Recommendation
Federal law should be amended so that farm owners or operators
are assigned responsibility for unpaid Unemployment Insurance
taxes owed by the crew leaders with whom they contract for
workers on their farms. 2

The Council finds that some employers improperly avoid paying Unemployment Insurance taxes by misclassifying their employees as independent
contractors. Clear definitions that delineate the conditions under which an
individual would legitimately be qualified as an independent contractor
would help to alleviate this problem.
Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 protects businesses that have "reasonable basis" for misclassifying employees as independent contractors.
Businesses that fall under the Section 530 "safe harbor" are not required to
correct the classification of employees and cannot be assessed back taxes or
penalties based on the misclassification of workers. Section 530 also prohibits
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from clarifying the guidelines for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. The
ambiguity of these guidelines is the cornerstone of the misclassification probI

2

Two members of the Council object to this recommendation.
One member of the Council objects to this recommendation.
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lem and the tax revenue losses associated with it. In addition, revenue collection is limited by Section 3509 of the Internal Revenue Code, which caps the
employment tax liability of those businesses not covered by Section 530.
The greatest revenue loss results from businesses that do not file information returns on independent contractors. These are circumstances under
which businesses are most likely to misclassify workers, as well as the circumstances under which independent contractors are least likely to report
their entire income. Increasing the penalty for failing to file information
returns would increase the incentive to file, increase the percentage of independent contractor income reported, and provide the information needed to
identify employers that misclassify workers-thereby creating an incentive
to classify workers correctly.
While the Council recognizes that correcting these problems would have
ramifications that reach far beyond the Unemployment Insurance system, the
Council finds that the problems are sufficiently serious to merit action at both
the state and federal levels.

1995-11. Recommendation
States should review and consider adopting the best practices of
other states to address classification issues which include the following: clarifying the definitions of employee and independent
contractor; specifying employer liability for payroll taxes; licensing, bonding, or regulating the employee leasing industry; and
strategic targeting of audits.

1995-12. Recommendation
Federal law should be amended to eliminate the "prior audit" safe
harbor provision of Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978.

1995-13. Recommendation
Federal law should be amended to eliminate the provIsion of
Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 that bars the IRS from
issuing guidelines to define the employment relationship.
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1995-14. Recommendation
Federal law should be amended to repeal Section 3509 of the
Internal Revenue Code and to require businesses to pay all taxes
owed for workers that are misclassified after the enactment of the
repeal.

1995-15. Recommendation
The $50 penalty for businesses that fail to file information returns
with the IRS or with the independent contractor they have hired
should be increased.

The Council notes that available statistics do not accurately measure the
level of Unemployment Insurance receipt among the unemployed (that is,
"recipiency"). The measure of the "insured unemployed" (IU) and the ratio
of insured unemployed to the covered labor force (that is, the insured unemployment rate-the IUR) are frequently used for a number of purposes. When
used as measures of recipiency, however, they are misleading. Both statistics
consistently overstate the number of individuals who actually receive
Unemployment Insurance benefits in a given week. In addition to counting
recipients, the two measures both include individuals who file a claim for, but
do not receive, benefits in a given week (these include individuals on a waiting week, individuals whose claims are ultimately denied for nonmonetary
reasons, and individuals who are disqualified for a given week). At the
national level, this inclusion has the effect of overstating the number of the
unemployed who actually receive Unemployment Insurance benefits by
approximately 10 percent (although there is considerable variation among
the states in the extent to which currently reported statistics overstate the
actual receipt of benefits). *
1995-16. Recommendation
The U.S. Department of Labor should report a measure of Unemployment Insurance recipiency. The measure should be a ratio,
with the numerator defined as the number of individuals who are
actually paid Unemployment Insurance benefits, and the denominator defined as the total number of unemployed individuals.
*Additional recommendations regarding data can be found in 1995-24, and 1996-12 to 1996-15.
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ELIGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS

Five percent of all workers in 1993 reported that they were unable to find
full-time employment, and 16 percent of the work force held part-time jobs.
The Council finds that in some states, these individuals are unable to qualify
for Unemployment Insurance benefits, even when they have substantial labor
force attachment. This problem is especially pronounced for low-wage individuals, many of whom must work in temporary or part-time jobs. Welfare
reform could result in an increase in the number of low-wage workers who
find themselves in this situation.
Some unemployed workers are unable to qualify for Unemployment
Insurance benefits because of their state's definition of the "base period." The
base period is the period of time that is used for calculating whether or not
unemployed individuals' earnings are sufficient to qualify them for
Unemployment Insurance. Many states define the base period as the first four
of the past five completed calendar quarters. In these states, therefore,
between three and six months of an individual's most recent work experience
is excluded from consideration in calculating eligibility for benefits. This
may have the effect of disqualifying some workers who have worked continuously, but who need the most recently completed quarter of earnings to be
included in the base period in order to qualify for Unemployment Insurance
benefits. To solve this problem, some states now use a "moveable base period," which allows the minimum earnings requirement to be met on the basis
of the four most recently completed quarters of work if it is not met using the
standard definition.
The Council finds that advances in technology have made it feasible for
all states to use the most recently completed quarter when determining benefit eligibility, and that using this quarter is consistent with the legislative
requirement that states ensure full payment of Unemployment Insurance
when due. While the Council has been unable to develop sound estimates of
the cost of implementing such a change, there are reasons to believe that the
cost may not be prohibitive. First, many of the individuals who are determined to be eligible using a moveable base period would become eligible
eventually (as soon as an additional quarter of earnings information becomes
available). Second, some of the increase in the cost of Unemployment
Insurance benefits would be offset by a reduction in benefits paid under
means-tested programs, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) and Food Stamps.
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In some cases, unemployed individuals cannot qualify for Unemployment
Insurance benefits because their eligibility is contingent upon their earnings
in the calendar quarter in which they became unemployed. Information about
their most recent earnings is typically not available until after the quarter has
been completed. These individuals often do not realize that they can reapply
(and often qualify) for benefits when information about their most recent
quarter of earnings becomes available. This problem could be corrected if
these individuals were told when they should reapply for benefits, as well as
what additional earnings they would need to qualify for benefits.

1995-17. Recommendation
All states should use a moveable base period in cases in which its
use would qualify an Unemployment Insurance claimant to meet
the state's monetary eligibility requirements. When a claimant fails
to meet the monetary eligibility requirement for Unemployment
Insurance, the state should inform the individual in writing of what
additional earnings would be needed to qualify for benefits, as well
as the date when the individual should reapply for benefits.
In some states, low-wage workers face an additional impediment in qualifying for Unemployment Insurance benefits. In order to meet their state's
base period and/or high-quarter earnings requirements, low-wage individuals must work more hours than workers who earn higher wages. For example, an individual who works half-time for a full year (i.e., 1,040 hours) at
the federal minimum wage level would n9t meet minimum earnings requirements in 9 states. At an hourly wage of $8.00, however, a half-time, fullyear worker would be eligible in all states. Similarly, an individual who
works two days per week for a full year (approximately 800 hours) at the
minimum wage would not meet the minimum earnings requirements in 29
states. At a wage of $8.00 per hour, however, that individual would be eligible in all but 2 states.
The Council finds that any individual who works at least 800 hours per
year should be eligible for Unemployment Insurance benefits and that states'
minimum earnings requirements should be set accordingly. If all states set
their earnings requirements at this level, the number of individuals eligible
for Unemployment Insurance benefits would increase by approximately 5.3
percent, and the amount of benefits paid would increase by approximately
3.6 percent. Some of the increase in the cost to the system, however, would
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be offset by a reduction in receipt of means-tested benefits such as AFDC and
Food Stamps.

1995-18. Recommendation
Each state should set its law so that its base period earnings
requirements do not exceed 800 times the state's minimum hourly
wage, and so that its high quarter earnings requirements do not
exceed one-quarter of that amount.
Fourteen states preclude workers in seasonal industries from collecting
Unemployment Insurance except during the season in which work is normally done within the industry. In addition, twelve of these states disallow
seasonal workers' earnings from being counted toward their minimum earnings requirement, even if the individual subsequently works in a nonseasonal job. The Council finds these exclusions to be problematic.

1995-19. Recommendation
States should eliminate seasonal exclusions; claimants who have
worked in seasonal jobs should be subject to the same eligibility
requirements as all other unemployed workers.
In addition to the monetary requirements for qualifying for Unemployment Insurance, each state has a variety of nonmonetary requirements
that unemployed individuals must satisfy in order to qualify for benefits.
These requirements include stipulations about availability for suitable work,
ability to work, work search requirements, voluntary separation for good
cause, discharges due to misconduct, refusal of suitable work, and unemployment as a result of a labor dispute. In some cases, part-time workers
(who meet monetary eligibility requirements) are explicitly precluded from
receiving Unemployment Insurance.

1995-20. Recommendation
Workers who meet a state's monetary eligibility requirements
should not be precluded from receiving Unemployment Insurance
benefits merely because they are seeking part-time, rather than
full-time, employment.
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State legislation often does not address the specifics of many of the situations that Unemployment Insurance claimants face. As a result, interpretations of nonmonetary eligibility requirements can also be found in administrative and judicial case law and administrative rules. Testimony presented in
the Council's public hearings indicates that the complexity of these nonmonetary requirements creates confusion about eligibility requirements. It can be
difficult for both claimants and employers to understand these requirements
with a reasonable degree of certainty. These problems can be particularly
pronounced for multistate employers.
Not only can this lack of certainty impede the receipt of Unemployment
Insurance, it may also increase unnecessarily the number of appeals filed by
both claimants and employers. These problems appear to be particularly
severe with regard to determinations involving employee misconduct, refusal
of suitable work, and voluntary leaving for good cause. Clarifying these
issues would serve the interests of both groups. *

1995-21. Recommendation
A state-specific information packet that clearly explains
Unemployment Insurance eligibility conditions (both monetary
and nonmonetary) should be distributed by the states to unemployed individuals.
The Council is particularly concerned about a number of specific nonmonetary eligibility conditions. For example, it is not always clear whether
an individual who is unavailable for shift work (perhaps due to a lack of public transportation or child care) will be found to be eligible for
Unemployment Insurance. Consideration needs to be given to situations in
which individuals quit their jobs because of one of the following circumstances: a change in their employment situation (e.g., change in hours of
work), sexual or other discriminatory harassment, domestic violence, or
compelling personal reasons, including family responsibilities. In addition,
the Council is concerned about the variability in the definition of misconduct
across states, and about the treatment of individuals who refuse employment
because it is temporary or commission work. The Council intends to address
these and related issues in its third annual report. **
*Additional recommendations on this issue can be found in 1996-8 and 1996-10.
**See Recommendation 1996-8.
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ADEQUACY OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS
At the inception of the Unemployment Insurance system, much debate was
devoted to the adequacy of benefits. Many of the founders of the system
argued that benefits should replace 50 percent of lost earnings; they believed
that this percentage was high enough to allow workers to purchase basic
necessities, but not so high as to discourage prompt return to work.
A number of presidents, including and following Dwight Eisenhower,
have endorsed a goal of 50 percent replacement of lost earnings within the
Unemployment Insurance system. President Richard Nixon advocated that
the Unemployment Insurance system should seek to replace 50 percent of
lost earnings for four-fifths of all Unemployment Insurance recipients.
The level of a state's maximum weekly benefit amount has a direct
impact upon the percentage of Unemployment Insurance recipients who
receive benefits that equal or exceed a given replacement rate. Those individuals whose earnings qualify them for their state's maximum weekly benefit amount typically have less than half of their wages replaced. Therefore,
when a state's maximum benefit amount is relatively low as a percentage of
the state's average weekly wage, the state will not meet the 50 percent
replacement rate goal for a large percentage of recipients.
The Council endorses the long-standing goal of 50 percent replacement
of lost earnings, and notes that a state is likely to be able to achieve this goal
for a large number of workers by setting the state maximum weekly benefit
amount equal to two-thirds of state average weekly wages.
1995-22. Recommendation
For eligible workers, each state should replace at least 50 percent of
lost earnings over a six-month period, with a maximum weekly benefit amount equal to two-thirds of the state's average weekly wages. 3

The Council also notes that, starting in 1986, all Unemployment Insurance benefits became subject to taxation. Taxation of Unemployment Insurance benefits results in a reduction of the effective replacement rate.
1995-23. Recommendation
Unemployment Insurance benefits should be tax-exempt. 4
J
4

One member of the Council objects to this recommendation.
Four members of the Council object to this recommendation.
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The Council finds that the current system for reporting the average replacement rate of lost earnings within the Unemployment Insurance system
needs to be improved. While the U.S. Department of Labor routinely reports
the replacement rate, the concept used in the calculation is flawed. The
reported replacement rate is calculated by dividing Unemployment Insurance
benefits paid by the wages of all covered workers. To the extent that those
who receive Unemployment Insurance have lower wages than the average
covered worker, the reported replacement rate will understate the actual
replacement rate. Conversely, if those who receive Unemployment Insurance
have higher wages than the typical covered worker, the reported replacement
rate will overstate the actual replacement rate. Advisory Council calculations
using data available from selected states suggest that the reported replacement rate significantly understates the actual replacement rate. *

1995-24. Recommendation
The U.S. Department of Labor should calculate and report the
actual replacement rate for individuals who receive Unemployment Insurance. This replacement rate should be calculated
by dividing the weekly benefits paid to individuals by the average
weekly earnings paid to those individuals prior to unemployment.

REEMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES
The Council finds that financial incentives (such as reemployment bonuses
or self-employment subsidies) for facilitating rapid reemployment have a
positive impact on a small portion of the unemployed. In some cases, this
positive impact could be offset partially by negative impacts on others who
find jobs more slowly because they are displaced in the job queue by those
who receive the incentives. This displacement effect is likely to be more pronounced during periods of relatively high unemployment.
The Council concludes, therefore, that the states should be permitted to
experiment with reemployment incentives, but it opposes incentives to
encourage (or require) states to implement such strategies.
Some members of the Council object to the use of self-employment
incentives within the Unemployment Insurance system-especially when an
individual's entire benefit is paid in lump-sum form.

*Additional recommendations regarding data can be found in 1995-16, and 1996-12 to 1996-15.
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1995-25. Recommendation

States should be given broad discretion in determining whether
reemployment incentives, such as reemployment bonuses or selfemployment allowances, should be included as a part of their
Unemployment Insurance systems.

ADMINISTRATIVE FINANCING
States' administrative costs are financed by the federal government with a
portion of the revenues generated by FUTA. This situation requires some systematic method for allocating these revenues among the states. The Council
finds that whatever method is chosen, it is important to create financial
incentives for states to administer their Unemployment Insurance systems
efficiently. For example, those states that are able both to administer their
Unemployment Insurance systems with less money than is allotted to them
and to achieve U.S. Department of Labor performance requirements could be
allowed to keep all or part of the surplus for other uses within their UI systems. The Council intends to address this issue, in conjunction with the U.S.
Department of Labor's performance requirements, in its next annual report.*
The U.S. Department of Labor has proposed an Administrative Financing
Initiative (API) that would allocate FUTA funds based on a national unit cost
with base-level and contingency-level funding. The Council takes no position on the API, because the U.S. Department of Labor and the states have
not yet agreed on the details of this initiative.
The Council notes that it is inefficient for the federal government to
require employers to fill out and submit separate forms and payments for their
FUTA and state Unemployment Insurance taxes. Not only does this impose an
unnecessary paperwork burden on employers, it also creates redundant tax
. collection units in the federal and state governments. The expense of collecting Unemployment Insurance taxes could be reduced by allowing the states to
collect FUTA taxes on behalf of the federal government.
1995-26. Recommendation
FUTA taxes should be collected with other Unemployment
Insurance taxes by each of the states and submitted to the feder-

.

*See Recommendations 1996·6 to 1996-8, and 1996-16 to 1996-19, and the findings that precede
those recommendations.
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al government for placement in the federal trust fund. States'
Unemployment Insurance taxes should remain in the state trust
funds, as is currently the case.

3 / 1996 Findings
and Recommendations:
Defining Federal
and State Roles

THE NATION'S UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE system is based on the sharing of
responsibilities between the federal government and the state governments.
The Council finds that this framework, which has evolved over 60 years,
could be made more effective by implementing changes based on a refined
understanding of the appropriate division of responsibilities between the
federal and state partners. This finding leads the Council to a formulation
of the following statement of federal-state responsibilities in Unemployment Insurance. *
1996-1. Federal-State Responsibilities in Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment Insurance is a federal-state system of shared
responsibilities and powers. These powers and responsibilities
should be shared in the most effective possible manner. Whenever
appropriate, state governments should assume broad responsibilities for determining the elements of their Unemployment
Insurance programs. The federal government should assume
responsibility primarily in those areas in which both an essential
national interest exists and states' interests may diverge from
those national interests.
The fundamental objective of the system is the provision of
insurance in the form of temporary, partial wage replacement to
NOTE: These findings and recommendations are reprinted from Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation (ACUC), Defining Federal and State Roles in Unemployment Insurance (Washington,
DC: ACUC, 1996), pp. 7-19.
*The Council provided a statement of purpose for the Unemployment Insurance system in its
1995 report (see 1995-1).
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workers experiencing involuntary unemployment. Federal
involvement in this area should limit that competition among
states on the basis of Unemployment Insurance costs that undermines the integrity of the system and the capacity of the program
to insure workers adequately. A second objective of the system is
the accumulation of adequate funds during periods of economic
health, thereby promoting economic stability by maintaining consumer purchasing power during economic downturns. The
achievement of these fundamental purposes, which serve the
national interest and transcend the interests of any individual
state, require federal oversight and action.

FEDERAL-STATE INTERACTIONS
Federal Responsibility in Areas of Essential National Interest
As noted above, there are two primary areas of essential national interest that
may diverge from state interests: the provision of adequate insurance to
workers throughout the country and macroeconomic stabilization. The program's capacity to meet these two fundamental objectives first depends upon
the existence of state VI programs, and second, requires the proper functioning of a number of specific program components, each of which can be eroded through the dynamics of interstate competition. The components are enumerated in this section and are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this report.
The Council finds evidence that escalating competition among some
states to attract and retain business may result in VI tax rates that are lower
than they would be without this competition (see Chapter 4 of this report).
Reduced state VI taxes frequently result in tightened eligibility standards,
which adversely and disproportionately affect low-wage workers. In addition, tax competition could result in reductions in benefit levels or in diminished access to services.
Consequently, to ensure the achievement of the first national objectivethe provision of temporary, partial wage replacement to workers experiencing involuntary unemployment-the federal government should act to prevent any potentially destructive consequences arising from interstate competition. Thus, there are two primary areas in which federal involvement is necessary-minimum eligibility and benefit levels, and access to services.
To assure the achievement of the second national objective-the countercyclical stabilization of the national economy-a unified national strategy is
required. Thus, it is the responsibility of the federal government to take
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action, as necessary, to preserve the four components that enable the program
to stabilize the economy during periods of economic downturn. The four
components follow. First, state programs should be forward-funded with
independent trust funds in order to ensure that the VI system as a whole has
the capacity to inject additional money into the economy during recessions
and in order to reduce the need to raise taxes during economic downturns. *
Second, state VI benefit levels should be high enough and should be paid to
a large enough percentage of the involuntarily unemployed to support efficient economic stabilization efforts. ** Third, the capacity must exist to monitor and analyze national and local labor market conditions consistently and
quickly. Fourth, any supplemental mechanism for stabilization (for example,
Extended Benefits or contingency administrative funding during times of
unusually high unemployment) should be maintained and coordinated at the
national level. ***
Thus, to protect essential national interests, the federal government must
take responsibility for protecting specific components of the UI program
when autonomous state action might adversely affect the national interest. To
preserve the components discussed above, federal involvement is necessary
in the seven areas listed in Recommendation 2. In each of these areas, federal requirements should be as clear and as simple as possible.
1996-2. Recommendation

To preserve national interests in the UI system, the federal government should take an active role in the following areas:
(1) ensuring the existence of a UI system in each state; (2) promoting the forward funding of the system; (3) monitoring and
coordinating the collection of information on labor market conditions; (4) promoting economic stability by maintaining supplemental benefit programs that trigger on automatically during
recessions, thereby avoiding the need for costly federal emergency benefits; (5) coordinating the efficient pooling of risk by
making loans available to states experiencing prolonged recessions; (6) assuring that all workers with a given level of attach*The Council made recommendations on forward funding (Recommendations 1995-3 to 1995-6)
in its 1995 report.
**The Council made a number of recommendations in regard to eligibility and benefit levels in
its 1995 report (see, in particular, Recommendations 1995-9 and 1995-17 to 1995-20).
***The Council's recommendations for improving the operation of the Extended Benefits program are contained in its 1994 report (Recommendations 1994-1 to 1994-6).
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ment to the work force are eligible for a minimum level of benefits; and (7) promoting quality and efficiency in program outcomes.

Federal Oversight in Other Areas
While taking a role in the areas listed in Recommendation 2, the federal government should avoid involvement in program areas in which essential
national interests are not at stake. Indeed, in these areas, the federal government should take steps to encourage state experimentation and to enhance
state flexibility. Program details in such areas are better left to the discretion
of the states, which function more efficiently as "laboratories of democracy"
and which may be able to provide better service to their citizens. Thus, federal involvement should exist primarily in those areas in which there are
essential national interests at stake.
A number of current federal laws, federal regulations, and federal oversight functions affecting VI do not meet these criteria and should therefore
be repealed or discontinued. Included are the following: requirements that
the states must disqualify certain categories of workers (for example, professional athletes and school employees who are between terms) and reduce
unemployed workers' VI benefits if they receive certain other types of
retirement income; standards that the states must meet in order to qualify for
full Extended Benefits funding (for example, the imposition of a waiting
week for benefits and requirements that recipients meet stricter definitions
of continuing eligibility); and a variety of oversight functions which are discussed below.

1996-3. Recommendation
Federal requirements that states disqualify certain categories of
workers (for example, professional athletes and school employees
who are between terms) should be repealed.

1996-4. Recommendation
Federal requirements that certain types of workers' retirement
income offset UI benefits should be repealed.
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1996-5. Recommendation

Federal requirements that states meet certain standards in order
to receive full funding for Extended Benefits should be repealed.

ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES
Measurement of Performance Outcomes

Performance measures within the UI system should focus on program outcomes rather than on program processes, since the latter are within the
purview of the states. In addition, performance requirements should be confined to areas in which there is both an essential national interest and a potential divergence of national and state interests. There is no need to monitor
program inputs or state performance in areas in which state and national
interests coincide. Moreover, these areas involve program processes rather
than program outcomes, which, as stated, should be the responsibility of the
states. Some of these areas, including aspects of benefit payment and revenue
collection, are currently regulated by elaborate federal quality control programs (see Chapters 5 and 6).
By selecting only essential measures of performance outcomes, the federal government would underscore the importance of state performance on
those particular measures. Currently, the relative importance of various outcomes may be obscured by the large number of performance measurements
required of the states. Further, the elimination of unnecessary performance
measures should reduce state administrative burdens considerably and would
ensure that available resources were dedicated to achieving the outcomes
identified as most essential to the functioning of the system. Finally, the
selection of clear and easily measured outcomes would promote a better
understanding of the Unemployment Insurance system.
The federal government should, however, require the measurement of
performance outcomes in essential program areas in which national and state
interests may diverge. Some such areas are not currently subject to performance measurement, including forward funding and the ease of claimants'
access to the system, which is discussed below.
The Council is aware of the efforts of the Performance Enhancement
Work Group, which consists of representatives from the state employment
security agencies (SESAs) and the U.S. Department of Labor. This group has
been working since 1993 to improve the performance of the UI system by
improving the measurement of performance within the system. While this
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collaborative effort is commendable, additional work needs to be done on the
fundamental issues· of forward funding and access to the system.
The Council finds that there would be benefit in undertaking a more fundamental re-engineering of UI performance measurement. Such an effort
should be based on careful consideration of the basic objectives of the UI
program. Required performance measures, as well as the reports on UI that
the U.S. Department of Labor requires of the states, should be designed to
ensure that the basic objectives of the system are achieved.
The Council finds that four principles should be applied in shaping an
appropriate set of outcomes to be measured within the Unemployment
Insurance system. First, the measures should reflect the fundamental purposes of the Unemployment Insurance system. Second, performance measures
should focus on the system's outcomes, rather than on the amount of input or
the processes by which outcomes are achieved. Third, those measures of performance outcomes that are identified as essential should be as clear and simple as possible. Fourth, the application of these measures of performance
should ensure equity in the treatment of both claimants and employers.

1996-6. Recommendation
The federal priority in the area of performance measurement
should be to ensure that required performance measures emphasize the essential national interests of the UI system. The national
interests that could be influenced by the system of performance
measurement, but that are not currently incorporated in it,
include forward funding and access to the system.
The current federal emphasis on benefit quality control measures is
excessive and should be reduced, because ensuring that benefits are not overpaid should be a state rather than a federal responsibility. Similarly, ensuring
that ill taxes are collected when they are due is a state responsibility that can
be accomplished with minimal federal oversight. Given that employers' tax
rates form a critical part of the nation's statistical system, some federal oversight in this regard is appropriate.

1996-7. Recommendation
In cooperation with the U.S. Department of Labor, states should
develop, monitor, and report their own measures of the quality
of their procedures for UI benefit payment and revenue collec-
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tion, using generally accepted accounting principles and auditing standards.
1996-8. Recommendation

The u.s. Department of Labor should work in partnership with
the states to develop measures of access to the UI system. These
measures should include but should not necessarily be limited to
the ease with which individuals can apply for benefits and the
extent to which individuals with a substantial attachment to the
labor force are eligible for benefits.
Factors to be considered in developing measures of the ease
with which individuals can apply for benefits should include the
following: (1) whether information that clearly explains the application process is readily available, (2) how much time is required
to complete the application process, and (3) whether it is possible
to apply for benefits in languages commonly spoken by those who
are served by the program.
Factors that should be considered in developing measures of
access to the UI system include whether individuals with a substantial work history are excluded for any of the following reasons:
(1) they have worked in seasonal jobs, (2) their wages are low,
(3) their most recently completed quarter of wages was not included in measuring their monetary eligibility, (4) they quit their job for
legitimate family-related reasons, (5) they are unable to accommodate an employer's change in job conditions, (6) they are seeking part-time work, or (7) they are unable to accept shift work.
Inadequate or incomplete information about the VI claims or appeals
processes among some claimants may have the effect of restricting their
access to the VI system. Similarly, a lack of information or understanding
among some employers may result in their being charged for illegitimate
claims, resulting in higher VI taxes. In its 1995 report, the Council recommended that states distribute an information packet on eligibility requirements to unemployed individuals. Additional state efforts would also help
guarantee that all parties interact equitably-"on a level playing field"within the VI system. These efforts should be directed at ensuring that
claimants and employers enter the system with a common understanding of
the nature of relevant proceedings.
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1996-9. Recommendation
Each state should establish a mechanism, such as an ombudsman's
office, to provide claimants or employers with any requested
information on procedures or requirements in the claims or
appeals processes.
1996-1 O. Recommendation
The federal guarantee of a fair hearing should be interpreted to
include the unrestricted right of appeals participants to representation of their own choosing. Each state should provide clear
notice of this right to all claimants and employers.
1996-11. Recommendation
Each state should provide information to claimants and employers
on available sources of advice or advocacy assistance.
Data Needs and Reporting Requirements
Throughout its long history, the UI program has produced a vast amount of
information. These UI data are used for a variety of purposes, such as administering the UI program itself, facilitating its interaction with other federal
and state programs, and contributing information to the nation's statistical
system. For example, the UI tax records and data collected by the states to
determine labor force attachment and the earnings of workers cover most of
the nation's business establishments and almost all of the nation's workers.
These data constitute a large body of administrative information about the
labor market and are therefore extraordinarily important.
Individual states use UI information to operate the program, to evaluate
efficiencies, and to conduct research on UI issues. The federal UI Service
uses the data to monitor the work of the states, to carry out Ul research, to
administer the system, and to ensure that federal UI program standards have
been met. In addition, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the statistical
arm of the U.S. Department of Labor, relies on the state employment and
earnings reports for survey benchmarks, and it uses the UI tax records to
form the universe of business establishments for sample surveys.
In spite of these varied uses, little systematic attention has been given to
the comparability, accuracy, and completeness of this rich data source.
Indeed, the Council frequently found it impossible to obtain comparable state
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data for analyzing many of the questions it addressed. Further, only occasional attention has been given to the format, editing standards, uniformity of
data definition, completeness, and ease of computerized access to the base of
information that flows from the UI system.
These conditions are not surprising. Until recently, the informational
value of administrative data was not universally recognized. Few have understood the need for the precision and quality control that distinguish a statistical database for research purposes from a program database that ensures the
delivery of services. Today, data are increasingly used to monitor the economy and to evaluate public policy, and the value of administrative program
records as an efficient and cost-effective source of information with minimal
need for additional reporting burden cannot be overlooked. To allow fuller
utilization of this resource, the quality and comparability of these administrative data should be improved.
Congress has already taken some steps to meet this need. In 1992, it
required the BLS to determine procedures for creating a national longitudinal wage record database with information on earnings, establishment and
industry classification, and geographic location of employment for all workers covered by the UI system. This improved database will be extremely
valuable for research, program evaluation, and statistical purposes.
Nor should other survey-based sources of data about the UI system be
overlooked. The BLS-sponsored Current Population Survey (CPS) provides
a rich body of information about the U.S. labor force, employment, and
unemployment. The UI Service, which has occasionally sponsored special
supplements of the CPS, should develop a careful plan for regular periodic
supplements to collect detailed information on UI recipients.
Another important survey source of data used for UI research is the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), conducted by the
Bureau of the Census. The SIPP provides an important longitudinal database
that includes workers who receive UI benefits, as well as those who participate in other federal and state-sponsored programs. While the SIPP provides
much important information about the behavior of UI recipients that is not
available elsewhere, many researchers find it unwieldy and extremely difficult to use. It is important that SIPP data be made more accessible.
In summary, the Council finds a need for a systematic and comprehensive
system of administrative and survey data about the UI program for use in the
following areas: (1) analytical research on the program's outcomes, (2)
development of improvements in the program's conceptual design, and (3)
enhancement of the country's understanding of the labor market behavior of
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workers and employers covered by the program. In addition, there is significant need to improve the quality and timeliness of the VI tax reports, which
form the universe for sample selection and the benchmark for many of the
nation's most important statistical selies. The Council finds that the federal
government should be responsible for the design and oversight of a comprehensive VI information system consisting of administrative and survey-based
data that are comparable among all states. *

1996-12. Recommendation
The U.S. Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance Service,
with advice from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, should design the
elements of a comprehensive information system of UI data that
are comparable in definition and format for all states. Some of the
elements that should be included are data on (1) coverage and eligibility by earnings level and by type of worker; (2) the elements of
labor market attachment; (3) the levels and duration of benefits
paid; (4) the extent and causes of nonmonetary disqualifications;
(5) labor market information at the national, state, and local levels; (6) the extent of forward funding of state trust funds; and (7)
the quality, efficiency, and cost of program administration at both
the federal and state levels. Each state should maintain its database
in accordance with U.S. Department of Labor requirements so that
statistical standards, definitional comparability, and easy computer access for all users can be maintained.

1996-13. Recommendation
The U.S. Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance Service
should continue to plan and sponsor biennial supplements to the
Current Population Survey on UI issues.

1996-14. Recommendation
Because of the importance of the quarterly report on employment
and wages (the ES-202 report) to the measurement of the national income and product accounts, and because of the importance
of UI tax records to the nation's system of sample surveys, the
*The Council made two specific recommendations about data collection in its 1995 report
(Recommendations 1995-16 and 1995-24).
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accuracy and statistical quality of these reports must be improved.
Giving consideration to costs, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, with
advice from the Unemployment Insurance Service, should establish standard procedures that states should follow regarding the
development of these data; establish magnetic-media format standards for computer compatibility and accessibility; and establish
minimum requirements for editing, data quality, and timeliness.

1996-15. Recommendation
As required by law, the Bureau of Labor Statistics should continue its work on the development of a National Wage Record
Database. The Bureau should develop rules to protect the confidentiality of those workers and business establishments included
in the database for purposes of research and evaluation. Congress
should provide legal protection to ensure this confidentiality.

Administrative Funding
The Council finds that the nation's Unemployment Insurance system is
subject to downward pressure because of the forces of interstate competition. It is imperative that the federal government exercise leadership to
ameliorate these pressures. An important arena for such leadership concerns the method by which the federal government allocates funds under
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) to the states for administering
the DI system. Indeed, the critical importance of efficient administration
was cited by the Committee on Economic Security in 1935 as the reason
for originally assigning the cost of state administration of the UI program
to the federal government.
The mechanism for allocating FUTA funds to the states for administrative
purposes should be as simple as possible, and should provide incentives to
promote efficiency and quality in state administration. As currently constructed, however, the system of allocating administrative funds contains no
such incentives. Funding levels are based roughly on the expected claims
workload, on measures of time (generally based on manual processing) for
administrative tasks, and on overhead costs. Under this formula, states with
higher costs receive higher levels of reimbursements.
More importantly, the formula provides no direct link between administrative funds and improvements in performance, and there are no overall
quality measures related to funding decisions. In the Council's view, states
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that provide better services to claimants and employers by improving quality and efficiency should receive financial rewards for doing so. This might
be achieved through a number of mechanisms, including the tying of
administrative funding levels to state performance in certain essential areas
and increasing the federal government's use of challenge or innovation
grants to states.
The Council finds that the appropriation of administrative funding on the
basis of predicted workloads, reflecting economic conditions and increases in
operating costs, is the method that best serves the needs of claimants,
employers, and state agencies for reliable and predictable levels of administrative funding. These appropriations should be automatically adjusted to
cover the costs of increased workload for claims above the predicted level.
The Council affirms its concern that adequate amounts of dedicated FUTA
payroll tax revenues be made available to state agencies and to the U.S.
Department of Labor for their intended uses, and that appropriations of these
funds not be limited by budgetary factors external to the UI system. *

1996-16. Recommendation
Congress should appropriate FUTA trust funds in amounts adequate to fund state and federal UI activities on the basis of workload predictions using economic factors, with a contingency
reserve provision to cover the costs of increased workloads arising during a fiscal year.

1996-17. Recommendation
In order to support automation, development of one-stop services, and improvements in customer services, added state
administrative funds beyond those needed for base funding
should be provided through innovation grants by the U.S.
Department of Labor.

1996-18. Recommendation
The U.S. Department of Labor should promptly review its current
reporting and oversight requirements, in consultation with the
states, and should reduce or eliminate requirements in areas in
*The Council made a recommendation in this regard in its 1995 report (Recommendation 1995-7),
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which state and national interests are not in conflict or in which
federal responsibilities are not directly related to a requirement.
1996-19. Recommendation
States should be given greater flexibility to identify employers for
tax auditing. As an incentive for more effective auditing, the federal government should permit states to retain 50 percent of any
FUTA revenues that are generated through state's redirected
auditing activities.

EXPERIENCE RATING AND FUNDING
As the Council noted in it second annual report, the Unemployment
Insurance system's capacity to achieve one of its fundamental purposespromoting economic stability-rests on two key aspects of its funding mechanism. First, the funding of the system is "experience rated"-that is,
employers who have been responsible for greater demands on the system pay
higher taxes and consequently bear a greater share of the system's costs.
Second, during periods of prosperity, the system accumulates reserves that
are then spent during periods of economic decline.
Empirical evidence indicates that experience rating helps discourage temporary layoffs, thereby lowering the overall level of unemployment. In addition, the evidence suggests that experience-rated taxes are more effective
than are flat taxes in influencing employer behavior in this regard. This may
be because experience-rated taxes are borne primarily by employers, whereas flat taxes are more easily passed on indirectly to employees or to consumers. By assigning a greater share of the costs of the system to employers
responsible for greater demands on it, a system of experience rating allocates
costs more equitably among employers. Finally, experience rating gives
employers an interest in ensuring that benefits are paid only to individuals
who meet the program's eligibility criteria.
Some members of the Council are concerned, however, with a number of
aspects of the experience-rating system. First, such a system often imposes
costs on firms precisely when they are in the weakest economic position.
Second, under a system of experience rating, some employers might make
excessive use of the appeals system. There is evidence that employers'
appeals rates have increased in recent years and that they are losing a higher
percentage of the appeals they file. Finally, the steady decline in the level of
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the taxable wage base in real dollars may have the effect of reducing the
degree to which the system is experience-rated and forward-funded.
Given these differing perspectives, the Council makes no recommendation with regard to experience rating within the VI system.
With respect to the second key element of the VI system's funding-the
accumulation of reserves during periods of prosperity-empirical evidence
indicates that, holding all else constant, those states with higher taxable wage
bases have higher VI trust fund reserves. Thus, in order to promote the forward funding of the VI system-a federal responsibility-one of the most
effective mechanisms is to raise the minimum taxable wage base. *
1996-20. Recommendation

The federal taxable wage base should be raised to $9,000, with an
accompanying elimination of the two-tenths percentage point
FUTA surcharge. The federal taxable wage base should be adjusted annually by the Employment Cost Index.'

*The Council made another recommendation in regard to the taxable wage base in its 1994 report
(Recommendation 1994-5).
I Three members of the Council object to the first sentence of Recommendation 1996-20, and five
members object to its second sentence.
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Additional Copies

For additional copies of this compendium or for copies of the Advisory
Council on Unemployment Compensation's annual reports from 1994,1995,
or 1996, please call Esther R. Johnson of the U.S. Department of Labor at
(202) 219-7831. Requests may also be submitted in writing to the following
address:
Ms. Esther R. Johnson
Unemployment Insurance Service
U.S. Department of Labor
200 Constitution Avenue, NW, Room S-4231
Washington, DC 20210

The information contained in this publication will be made available to
sensory-impaired individuals upon request. Voice phone: (202) 219-7831;
TDD Message Retrieval phone: (800) 326-2577.

